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ABSTRACT. After decades of intense debate over the old pessimistic induction (Laudan, 
1977; Putnam, 1978), it has now become clear that it has at least the following four  
problems. First, it overlooks the fact that present theories are more successful than past 
theories. Second, it commits the fallacy of biased statistics. Third, it erroneously groups 
together past theories from different fields of science. Four, it misses the fact that some 
theoretical components of past theories were preserved. I argue that these four problems 
entitle us to construct what I call the grand pessimistic induction that since the old 
pessimistic induction has infinitely many hidden problems, the new pessimistic induction 
(Stanford, 2006) also has infinitely many hidden problems. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Pessimists constructed the old pessimistic induction (Laudan, 1977; Putnam, 1978) 
and the new pessimistic induction (Stanford, 2006) to rebut scientific realism, the 
view that successful scientific theories are (approximately) true. After decades of 
intense debate between scientific realists and pessimists, it has now become clear 
that the old pessimistic induction has at least four problems. On the basis of the 
four problems, I construct what I call the grand pessimistic induction that since the 
old pessimistic induction has infinitely many hidden problems, the new pessimistic 
induction also has infinitely many hidden problems. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, I expound the old pessimistic 
induction, four problems with it, and then new pessimistic induction. In Section 3, I 
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unpack the grand pessimistic induction, delineating how it is structured, how it is 
justified, how it refutes the new pessimistic induction, and how it can be attacked. 
In Section 4, I anticipate and reply to five possible objections to the grand pessimistic 
induction. In short, this paper fleshes out and defends the grand pessimistic induction 
with the use of the very theoretical resources that pessimists have deployed to attack 
scientific realism. 
Let me first clarify some key terms. “Old pessimists” and “new pessimists” 
refer to those who embrace, respectively, the old pessimistic induction and the new 
pessimistic induction. “Pessimists” refers to old and new pessimists. They are pessi- 
mistic about scientific theories and/or scientists. By contrast, “grand pessimists” 
refers to those who embrace the grand pessimistic induction. They are pessimistic 
about the old pessimistic induction, the new pessimistic induction, and pessimists. 
 
2. The Old and New Pessimistic Inductions 
 
The old pessimistic induction holds that since past theories were rejected, present 
theories will also be rejected. This formulation of the old pessimistic induction 
largely follows those of old pessimists. Larry Laudan asserts that most “of the past 
theories of science are already suspected of being false; there is presumably every 
reason to anticipate that current theories of science will suffer a similar fate” (1977: 
126). Hilary Putnam similarly claims that just “as no term used in the science of 
more than fifty (or whatever) years ago referred, so it will turn out that no term 
used now (except maybe observational terms, if there are such) refers” (1978: 25).  
Why should we accept the premise of the old pessimistic induction that past 
theories were discarded? Old pessimists might appeal to Laudan’s list:1 
 
Laudan’s List 
-the crystalline spheres of ancient and medieval astronomy;  
-the humoral theory of medicine;  
-the effluvial theory of static electricity; 
-“catastrophist” geology, with its commitment to a universal (Noachian) deluge; 
-the phlogiston theory of chemistry; 
-the caloric theory of heat; 
-the vibratory theory of heat; 
-the vital force theories of physiology; 
-the electromagnetic aether; 
-the optical aether; 
-the theory of circular inertia; 
-theories of spontaneous generation (Laudan, 1981: 33). 
 
Laudan’s list plays a crucial role in the old pessimistic induction. Without it, the old 
pessimistic induction evaporates, for the premise would merely be an assumption.  
Let me introduce four objections that philosophers have raised against the old 
pessimistic induction. First, present theories are more successful than past theories, 
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i.e., present theories explain and predict more phenomena than past theories did. 
This objection is raised by Alan Musgrave (1985: 211), Jarrett Leplin (1997: 141), 
Gerald Doppelt, (2007: 111; 2014), Juha Saatsi (2009: 358), Michael Devitt (2011: 
292), Ludwig Fahrbach (2011: 1290), Seungbae Park (2011: 80), and Moti Mizrahi 
(2013). On these philosophers’ account, the superiority of present theories over 
past theories invalidates the pessimistic inference from past to present theories. 
Second, Fahrbach (2011: 148), Park (2011: 79), and Mizrahi (2013: 3220; 2015, 
forthcoming) point out that the old pessimistic induction, based on Laudan’s list, 
commits the fallacy of biased statistics. The theories on the list were drawn from 
distant past science, but not from recent past science. The number of recent past 
theories, such as the germ theory, the special theory of relativity, the kinetic theory, 
and evolutionary theory, is far larger than the number of distant past theories, such 
as the humoral theory, the ether theory, the caloric theory, and the phlogiston theory. 
Recent past theories have not yet been overturned, while distant past theories were 
overturned. 
Wray (2015) accepts the foregoing three philosophers’ criticism against the old 
pessimistic induction, although Wray (2013) vigorously defended the old pessimistic 
induction. He says that “if one focuses on the recent history of science, one may 
find that most theories have not in fact been rejected,” and that “only the fate of our 
most recently developed theories are relevant to determining what we can expect of 
today’s best theories” (2015: 63). On his account, we should consider recent past 
theories, but not distant past theories, to determine whether present theories will be 
overthrown. 
Third, Marc Lange (2002) observes that scientific revolutions occurred in differ- 
ent frequencies in different fields of science. For example, there were transitions of 
the various theories of light from Newton’s particle theory, to Fresnel’s wave 
theory, to Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory, to Einstein’s particle theory, and to 
the quantum theory of light. These four transitions occurred in less than 120 years 
between the early nineteenth century and the early twentieth century (Wray, 2015: 
64). By contrast, the Ptolemaic theory remained unchallenged for about 1,200 years 
until the mid-sixteenth century (Wray, 2015: 64). 
Wray accepts Lange’s criticism of the old pessimistic induction, saying that 
pessimists should “be careful not to indiscriminately group together theories de- 
veloped under very different circumstances, and thus generalize from an unnatural 
grouping” (Wray, 2015: 64). It is wrong to conclude that present theories in all 
fields of science will be rejected by appealing to a list of past theories drawn from 
all fields of science. We should rather take different epistemic attitudes towards 
different theories, depending on how often scientific revolutions have occurred in 
different fields of science. 
Fourth, selectivists claim that some theoretical components of past theories are 
retained in present theories, while other theoretical components were discarded. They 
disagree with one another over what the preserved components are. John Worrall 
(1989) claims that they are mathematical equations. Philip Kitcher (1993: 140–
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149) and Stathis Psillos (1999, Chapter 5 and 6) claim that they are working posits. 
Pierre Cruse and David Papineau (2002) claim that they are Ramsey sentences. 
Selectivists, however, agree that not all theoretical constituents of past theories were 
abandoned. 
Wray (2015: 69) is convinced of selectivism, approvingly citing Anjan 
Chakravartty, who says that “there appears to be a great deal of preservation of 
mathematical structure across theories over time” (Chakravartty, 2008: 155). For 
example, the mathematical structure of Fresnel’s ether theory was retained in 
Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory, although the ontology of the ether theory was 
discarded. Thus, the old pessimistic induction “does not necessarily spell doom for 
scientific realism” (Wray, 2015: 70). 
Let me now turn to the new pessimistic induction that since past scientists could 
not conceive of present theories, present scientists cannot conceive of future 
theories. Why should we accept the premise that past scientists could not conceive 
of present theories? It is supported by Stanford’s list: 
 
Stanford’s List 
-from elemental to early corpuscularian chemistry to Stahl’s phlogiston theory to 
Lavoisier’s oxygen chemistry to Daltonian atomic and contemporary chemistry 
-from various versions of preformationism to epigenetic theories of embryology 
-from the caloric theory of heat to later and ultimately contemporary thermodynamic 
theories 
-from effluvial theories of electricity and magnetism to theories of the electro- 
magnetic ether and contemporary electromagnetism 
-from humoral imbalance to miasmatic to contagion and ultimately germ theories 
of disease 
-from eighteenth century corpuscular theories of light to nineteenth century wave 
theories to the contemporary quantum mechanical conception 
-from Darwin’s pangenesis theory of inheritance to Weismann’s germ-plasm theory 
to Mendelian and then contemporary molecular genetics 
-from Cuvier’s theory of functionally integrated and necessarily static biological 
species and from Lamarck’s autogenesis to Darwin’s evolutionary theory (Stanford, 
2006: 19–20). 
 
As Laudan’s list is an indispensable foundation of the old pessimistic induction, so 
Stanford’s list is an indispensable foundation of the new pessimistic induction. 
Without Stanford’s list, the premise of the new pessimistic induction would merely 
be an assumption. 
Stanford claims that the space of unconceived alternatives “appears to be in- 
determinate and unbounded” (2006: 133). Each field of science has infinitely many 
unconceived alternatives. There are infinitely many theories of light, theories of 
diseases, theories of heat, and so forth. No matter how many alternatives scientists 
may eliminate from the spaces of unconceived alternatives, infinitely many uncon- 
ceived alternatives will remain in the possibility spaces. Given that scientists are 
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finite beings, they will never be able to exhaust the possibility spaces, and thus will 
never be able to reach and recognize true scientific theories. Therefore, realism is 
doomed. 
Stanford argues that the new pessimistic induction is better than the old 
pessimistic induction because the new pessimistic induction overcomes the realist 
objection to the old pessimistic induction that present theories are more successful 
than past theories. How does it overcome the objection? There is an important dif- 
ference between the old and new pessimistic inductions. While the old pessimistic 
induction is over scientific theories, the new pessimistic induction is over scientists, 
i.e., while the old pessimistic induction is an inference from past to present theories, 
the new pessimistic induction is an inference from past to present scientists.  
Stanford claims that there is no relevant cognitive difference between past and 
present scientists. They are all “creatures whose cognitive constitutions are not well 
suited to the task of exhausting the kinds of spaces of serious candidate theoretical 
explanations from which our scientific theories are drawn” (Stanford, 2006: 45). So 
even if present theories are more successful than past theories, present theories will 
be displaced by unconceived alternatives, just as past theories were displaced by 
unconceived alternatives. It appears that Stanford thought up a clever way to get 
around the realist objection to the old pessimistic induction. 
 
3. The Grand Pessimistic Induction 
 
In the previous section, I highlighted four intrinsic problems with the old pessimistic 
induction. Those four problems, however, are not all the problems with it. There are 
other problems that have recently been recognized in the literature (Park, 2016a, 
2017). I, however, do not spell them out in this paper because the four problems are 
enough to get the grand pessimistic induction off the ground, which I unfold in this 
section. 
The grand pessimistic induction holds that since the old pessimistic induction 
has infinitely many hidden problems, the new pessimistic induction also has 
infinitely many hidden problems. Why should we accept the premise that the old 
pessimistic induction has infinitely many hidden problems? It is supported by the 
following list of intrinsic problems with the old pessimistic induction: 
 
The List of Problems 
- The old pessimistic induction overlooks the fact that present theories are more 
successful than past theories. 
- It commits the fallacy of biased statistics. 
- It erroneously groups together disparate past theories. 
- It misses the fact that some theoretical components of past theories were preserved. 
 
These four problems were hidden when the Laudan (1977) and Putnam (1978) put 
forward the old pessimistic induction. They were, however, exposed after decades 
of intense debate over it. There are even more problems with it, although we cannot 
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see them now, i.e., it has hitherto hidden problems. As time goes, they will be 
exposed. The more such problems are exposed, the stronger the inductive rationale 
will become for thinking that there are further such problems. It follows that the 
number of such problems is infinite. Since the old pessimistic induction has infinitely 
many problems, its successor, the new pessimistic induction, also has infinitely 
many problems. Grand pessimists predict that the new pessimistic induction will be 
replaced by a future pessimistic induction hitherto unconceived. But the future 
pessimistic induction has infinitely many problems, just as its two forerunners do. 
There are infinitely many such future pessimistic inductions. So it is of no use for 
pessimists to construct the successors of the new pessimistic induction with the view 
to rebutting realism. 
Grand pessimists construct the list of intrinsic problems with the old pessimistic 
induction, but not the list of intrinsic problems with the new pessimistic induction. 
They argue that the list of intrinsic problems with the old pessimistic induction is 
all that is required to refute all the successors behind it, just as pushing the first 
domino is all that is required to knock down all the dominos behind it. To reject 
this analogy is to give up the pessimist program altogether. Therefore, this paper 
purposefully refrains from constructing the list of intrinsic problems with the new 
pessimistic induction. 
Recall that according to Stanford, the new pessimistic induction is better than 
the old pessimistic induction because it gets around the realist objection that present 
theories are more successful than past theories. Grand pessimists, however, object 
that the new pessimistic induction is no better than the old pessimistic induction. 
The two pessimistic inductions are equally problematic, given that they are both 
infinitely problematic. They are equally problematic, no matter how large finite 
number of advantages the new pessimistic induction may have over the old pes- 
simistic induction. Thus, new pessimists’ appeal to infinity backfires on themselves. 
New pessimists might protest that they cannot see infinitely many problems 
with the new pessimistic induction. Grand pessimists, however, reply that new 
pessimists cannot see the infinitely many problems not because the new pessimistic 
induction does not have the infinitely many problems but because new pessimists 
are cognitively no better than old pessimists who could not see the infinitely many 
problems with the old pessimistic induction. Both old and new pessimists’ cognitive 
constitutions are not well suited to the task of exhausting the possibility spaces of 
hidden problems. Again, new pessimists are hoisted with their own petard. 
How can the grand pessimistic induction be attacked? To answer this question, 
we need to compare the two radically different ways in which past and present 
scientific theories are discredited under the pessimist framework. Pessimists reject 
past theories, such as Aristotelian mechanics and the humoral theory not on the 
grounds that they had problematic predecessors but on the grounds that intrinsic 
problems with them were exposed. By contrast, they reject present theories, such as 
Einsteinian mechanics and the germ theory not on the grounds that intrinsic prob- 
lems with them have been exposed but on the grounds that they have problematic 
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predecessors. It follows that the grand pessimistic induction should be discredited 
either in the way past theories were discredited, or in the way present theories are 
discredited, depending on whether it has a problematic forerunner or not.  
The grand pessimistic induction does not even have a precursor, let alone a 
problematic precursor. After all, it is the first pessimistic induction about pessimistic 
inductions. So it should be discredited not in the way present theories are dis- 
credited but in the way past theories were discredited. To put it differently, you 
cannot run a pessimistic induction against the grand pessimistic induction. You 
should rather expose intrinsic problems with it. 
It is much harder to discredit the first idea than its successor. It may take more 
than a thousand years to expose intrinsic problems with the first idea, as the case of 
the Ptolemaic theory illustrates. By contrast, it takes less than a minute to discredit 
the second idea. All that is required to refute it to point out that it has a problematic 
precursor. The first idea enjoys what I call the first-mover advantage, viz., it is not 
subject to a pessimistic induction. In contrast, its successor falls prey to a pessimistic 
specter, the moment it is proposed, due to the fact that it has a problematic 
forerunner. The grand pessimistic induction enjoys the first-mover advantage.  
 
4. Objections and Replies 
 
4.1. Behind the Old and New Pessimistic Inductions 
Pessimists might object that the grand pessimistic induction is a successor of the old 
and new pessimistic inductions, so the grand pessimistic induction has infinitely 
many problems, if the old and new pessimistic inductions have infinitely many 
problems. To use the domino analogy above, if the old pessimistic induction is 
knocked down, the new pessimistic induction and then the grand pessimistic 
induction will be knocked down. 
In my view, however, the idea that the grand pessimistic induction is a successor 
of the old and new pessimistic inductions is just as mistaken as the idea that the old 
pessimistic induction is a successor of past and present scientific theories. The old 
pessimistic induction is about past and present theories. How can it be their  
successor? No pessimist claims that since the caloric theory is refuted, the kinetic 
theory and then the old pessimistic induction will be refuted. In short, the old 
pessimistic induction is not behind but above past and present theories. Similarly, 
the grand pessimistic induction is about the old and new pessimistic inductions. 
How can it be their successor? It is not behind but above them. It follows that 
although the new and old pessimistic inductions are infinitely problematic, the grand 
pessimistic induction may not have a problem at all. In fact, the grand pessimistic 
induction can be free of a problem, provided that the old and new pessimistic 
inductions are infinitely problematic.  
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4.2. Hasty Generalizations 
Pessimists might object that two hasty generalizations inhere in the grand pessimistic 
induction. First, it is a hasty generalization that since the old pessimistic induction 
has four problems, it has infinitely many hidden problems. Such an inference is 
similar to the fallacious inference that since we observed four black crows, there 
are infinitely many black crows. Second, it is also a hasty generalization that since 
the old pessimistic induction is infinitely problematic, the new pessimistic induction 
is also infinitely problematic. Such an inference is similar to the fallacious inference 
that since we observed one black crow, the next crow is also black. 
Consider, however, that Stanford’s list includes the transition from the caloric 
theory to the kinetic theory. New pessimists maintain that there are infinitely many 
unconceived theories of heat on the grounds that they observed that there were two 
theories of heat in the history of science. Their inference is similar to the fallacious 
inference that since we observed two black crows, there are infinitely many black 
crows. New pessimists might reply that all past theories jointly constitute the reason 
for thinking that there are infinitely many theories of heat. Such a reply, however, 
is not available to new pessimists, for Wray earlier warned that pessimists should 
“be careful not to indiscriminately group together theories developed under very 
different circumstances, and thus generalize from an unnatural grouping” (2015: 64). 
In sum, the grand pessimistic induction is no worse off than the new pessimistic 
induction vis-à-vis the charge of hasty generalization.  
Pessimists might accuse me of committing the fallacy of tu quoque. In general, 
we cannot show that an argument is good by saying that it is similar to a bad 
argument. If it is similar to a bad argument, it is a bad argument too. Thus, to say 
that the grand pessimistic induction is no worse off than the new pessimistic 
induction is to say that the grand pessimistic induction is incorrect. Specifically, the 
grand pessimistic induction commits the fallacy of hasty generalization, just as the 
new pessimistic induction does. 
This objection to the grand pessimistic induction, however, has two unsavory 
implications for pessimists. First, the objection implies that the new pessimistic 
induction commits the fallacy of hasty generalization. As such problems accumulate, 
a list of intrinsic problems with the new pessimistic induction might emerge. 
Second, the objection also implies that the old pessimistic induction commits the 
fallacy of hasty generalization. It is a hasty generalization that since the caloric 
theory was surpassed by the kinetic theory, the kinetic theory will also be surpassed 
by a hitherto unconceived alternative. It follows that we can expand the list of 
intrinsic problems with the old pessimistic induction as follows:  
 
The List of Problems 
- The old pessimistic induction overlooks the fact that present theories are more 
successful than past theories. 
- It commits the fallacy of biased statistics. 
- It erroneously groups together disparate past theories. 
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- It misses the fact that some theoretical components of past theories were preserved. 
- It commits the fallacy of hasty generalization. 
 
Bear in mind that an attack on the grand pessimistic induction can also be directed 
at the new pessimistic induction, and can result in the expansion of the list of 
intrinsic problems with the old pessimistic induction. 
 
4.3. No Extrapolation 
Pessimists might object that it is wrong to extrapolate the fate of the new pessimistic 
induction from that of the old pessimistic induction. If the new pessimistic 
induction has hidden problems, that should be argued independently of the fact that 
the old pessimistic induction has hidden problems. In general, it is absurd to reason 
that an idea is problematic because it has a problematic predecessor.  
It is, however, self-defeating for pessimists to advance such an objection against 
the grand pessimistic induction because it applies equally well to the old and new 
pessimistic inductions. As noted before, pessimists operate under the assumption that 
scientific theories are like dominos, i.e., that the downfall of past theories constitutes 
an inductive rationale for expecting the downfall of present theories. Under that 
framework, grand pessimists expect the demise of the new pessimistic induction 
after observing the demise of the old pessimistic induction. To reiterate, grand 
pessimists do not expose intrinsic problems with the new pessimistic induction, just 
as pessimists do not expose intrinsic problems with present theories. 
If pessimists, however, insist that the new pessimistic induction should be 
appraised independently of how the old pessimistic induction was evaluated, grand 
pessimists also insist that present theories should be appraised independently of 
how past theories were evaluated. Since another problem with the old pessimistic 
induction is just exposed, grand pessimists expand the list of problems as follows:  
 
The List of Problems 
- The old pessimistic induction overlooks the fact that present theories are more 
successful than past theories. 
- It commits the fallacy of biased statistics. 
- It erroneously groups together disparate past theories. 
- It misses the fact that some theoretical components of past theories were preserved. 
- It commits the fallacy of hasty generalization. 
- It mistakenly extrapolates the fate of present theories from that of past theories. 
 
The last item on the list is of immense importance. If it is true, the old pessimistic 
induction cannot go through, even if pessimists have a flawless list of past theories. 
That is, even if the list is large enough, representative of the population of past 
theories, and reflective of the disparate fields of science, it is entirely an open 
question whether present theories will follow the course of past theories or not. 
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4.4. No Successor 
New pessimists might argue that the new pessimistic induction is not a successor of 
the old pessimistic induction, pointing out an important difference between them, 
viz., while the old pessimistic induction is about scientific theories, the new 
pessimistic induction is about scientists. So from the fact that the old pessimistic 
induction has hidden problems, it does not even probably follow that the new 
pessimistic induction also has hidden problems. 
The preceding move to drive a wedge between the old and new pessimistic 
inductions, however, does not go well with Stanford’s contention that the new 
pessimistic induction is better than the old pessimistic induction. He contends, you 
may recall, that the former overcomes, while the latter does not, the realist objection 
that present theories are more successful than past theories. His contention indicates 
that the new pessimistic induction is the successor of the old pessimistic induction. 
So if the latter has hidden problems, the former also has hidden problems. 
Moreover, if new pessimists say that the new pessimistic induction is not a 
successor of the old pessimistic induction, it is not clear on what grounds they can 
say that the kinetic theory is the successor of the caloric theory. After all, there is an 
important difference between them, viz., while the kinetic theory is about molecules, 
the caloric theory is about caloric. Despite this difference, however, new pessimists 
believe that the kinetic theory is the successor of the caloric theory. By parity of 
reasoning, they should also believe that the new pessimistic induction is the 
successor of the old pessimistic induction, although the former is over scientists 
while the latter is over scientific theories. 
 
4.5. Science vs. Philosophy 
Pessimists will now argue that science and philosophy are different enterprises, and 
that scientific ideas and scientists are vulnerable to pessimistic inductions, whereas 
philosophical ideas and philosophers are not. To put another way, a pessimistic in- 
ference from some scientific ideas to other scientific ideas, or from some scientists 
to other scientists, is legitimate, but a pessimistic inference from some philosophical 
ideas to other philosophical ideas, or from some philosophers to other philosophers, 
is illegitimate. The old pessimistic induction is a pessimistic inference from some 
scientific ideas to other scientific ideas, and the new pessimistic induction is a 
pessimistic inference from some scientists to other scientists. Thus, the old and new 
pessimistic inductions are inductively correct. By contrast, the grand pessimistic 
induction is a pessimistic inference from a philosophical idea to another philo- 
sophical idea. So it is inductively incorrect.  
The preceding move to separate philosophy and science has the following four 
problems. First, an argument is required for the bold assertion that science is vul- 
nerable to a pessimistic induction whereas philosophy is not. In the absence of such 
an argument, scientists would simply make the opposite assertion, viz., philosophy 
is susceptible to a pessimistic induction whereas science is not. Blunt scientists 
would add that it is the manifestation of philosophical arrogance to say that improve- 
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ment and achievement ensue philosophers’ mistakes whereas further mistakes and 
failures ensue scientists’ mistakes (Park, 2016b: 12). 
Second, grand pessimists protest that not all philosophical ideas are immune to 
a pessimistic induction. As we noted in Section 4, an idea is subject to a pessimistic 
induction or not, not depending on whether it is philosophical or scientific, but 
depending on whether it has a problematic forerunner or not. Some philosophical 
ideas, such as the new pessimistic induction, have precursors, whereas other 
philosophical ideas, such as the grand pessimistic induction, do not. So the new 
pessimistic induction falls prey to a pessimistic induction, whereas the grand 
pessimistic induction does not. To reiterate, the grand pessimistic induction enjoys 
the first mover advantage. 
Third, how about scientists and philosophers who practice their enterprises on 
the borderline between science and philosophy? For example, Sean Carroll at the 
California Institute of Technology is a theoretical physicist, but advocates diverse 
philosophical positions, including the many-worlds interpretation of quantum 
mechanics. Are such thinkers vulnerable to a pessimistic induction because they 
are scientists? Or are they immune to a pessimistic induction because they are 
philosophers? Pessimists owe us answers to these questions. 
Fourth, many philosophers rely on scientific theories to defend their philosophical 
views. For example, Thomas Kuhn (1962/1970: 172–173) uses evolutionary theory 
to defend his philosophical view about science. He argues that science does not move 
toward truths, just as biological organisms do not evolve toward a goal. Wray also 
relies on evolutionary theory to defend his philosophical view about science. He 
claims that old concepts are thrown out when an old scientific theory is superseded 
by a new scientific theory, just as a species loses some morphological features when 
it becomes a new species (Wray, 2011: 136). Are such philosophers’ philosophical 
views susceptible to a pessimistic induction or not? If they are, we have some 
examples of philosophical views that are susceptible to a pessimistic induction. But 
if they are not, we have an example of a scientific theory, viz., evolutionary theory, 
that is not susceptible to a pessimistic induction. Either way, it is false that the 
pessimistic specter pervades over science, but not over philosophy. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Worrall (1989: 99), Kitcher (1993: 136), Psillos (1999), P. D. Magnus and Craig 
Callender (2004: 322), and Wray (2013: 4321) claim that the old pessimistic 
induction is the most compelling argument against realism. Grand pessimists, how- 
ever, dispute this popular assessment of the old pessimistic induction, arguing that 
it is infinitely problematic, and that its successor, the new pessimistic induction, is 
also infinitely problematic. 
The grand pessimistic induction would be refuted, if a list of intrinsic problems 
with it were presented. It is a matter for future debate whether such a list can be 
constructed. Pessimists should be careful, though, when they make such a list, for 
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they might end up expanding the list of intrinsic problems with the old pessimistic 
induction, as we have already seen in Section 4. The grand pessimistic induction 
mirrors the new pessimistic induction, and the new pessimistic induction is similar 
to the old pessimistic induction. Hence, a criticism directed at the grand pessimistic 
induction can also be directed at the old pessimistic induction. Moreover, such a 
criticism can serve to generate a list of intrinsic problems with the new pessimistic 
induction, a list that I purposefully avoided constructing in this paper. 
Finally, it is also a matter for future debate what other hidden problems beset 
the old pessimistic induction. If they are exposed, they will be added to the list of 
intrinsic problems with the old pessimistic induction, will serve as positive instances 
confirming grand pessimists’ prediction that the old pessimistic induction has 
hitherto hidden problems, will strengthen the inductive rationale for thinking that 
there are yet more hidden problems, and as a result, will reinforce the grand 
pessimistic induction.  
In sum, we should shake off the initially appealing, but infinitely problematic, 
intuition that scientific revolutions will oust present theories, as they did past 
theories. 
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NOTE 
 
1. Laudan (1981: 33) presents the list not to support the old pessimistic induction but to 
undermine the alleged connection between success and approximate truth (Park, 2011: 76; 
Wray, 2015: 65; 2016: 366, footnote). 
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